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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
AND
WELL-BEING ANALYSIS?
LISA A. ROBINSON†
INTRODUCTION
1

Under Executive Order 12,866, as supplemented by Executive
2
Order 13,563, federal agencies are required to prospectively assess
the costs and benefits of significant regulations, and also to assess the
costs and benefits of alternatives if the annual impacts of the
3
regulations are expected to be equal to or greater than $100 million.
These analytic requirements can be traced back to the Ford
administration, which used cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to determine
4
whether major regulations would have inflationary impacts. More
generally, the roots of such analyses can be traced back to the 1800s,
when economists began developing the foundations of welfare
economics that underlie the practice of CBA today.
In recent years, some psychologists and economists have become
increasingly interested in how individuals rate their own happiness or
life satisfaction—often referred to as subjective well-being. In their
provocative article, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and
Jonathan Masur criticize the conduct of CBA, focusing on the
approaches used to value outcomes such as increased prices,
5
unemployment, and reduced mortality risks. They argue that wellCopyright © 2013 by Lisa A. Robinson.
† Senior Fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
1. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
note at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 126 (Supp. V 2012).
2. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
3. Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638. Implementing guidance is provided in
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
4. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 10–11 (1997).
5. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, WellBeing Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).
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being analysis (WBA) would effectively address their criticisms by
replacing the monetary measures of value used in CBA with well6
being units. As a counterpoint, Matthew Adler explores the research
7
on subjective well-being in detail. He concludes that the use of wellbeing data in policy evaluation is premature, given the need to clarify
how well-being should be defined as well as the need to improve how
8
it is measured.
Framing this discussion as “WBA versus CBA” seems far too
narrow, however. CBA and WBA aim to provide different types of
information, both of which are likely to be of interest to
decisionmakers. CBA is not, and should not be, the sole basis for
decisionmaking. Rather, it answers a particular question: How can we
best allocate scarce resources, given our understanding of individuals’
preferences? In CBA, preferences are measured by individuals’
willingness to trade money (which represents the ability to purchase
other goods and services) for the benefits provided by a particular
regulation. WBA asks a somewhat different question: How can we
best allocate these resources, given our understanding of individuals’
subjective well-being? In this case, well-being is measured by how
individuals rate the happiness or life satisfaction associated with
various states of being, such as income level or degree of health
impairment. Those involved in the policymaking process have diverse
interests and goals, and are likely to find these—as well as other types
of analysis—useful.
CBA’s longevity—and the substantial resources devoted to its
development and implementation—suggests that policymakers find
that it aids them in making difficult choices. CBA is not the only type
of analysis used to inform regulatory decisionmaking, however.
Government-wide guidelines instruct agencies to also prepare cost9
effectiveness analyses. These analyses involve dividing regulatory

6. Id. at 1617–18.
7. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?,
62 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2013).
8. Id. at 1599.
9. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 9 (“Both benefit-cost analysis
(BCA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) provide a systematic framework for identifying
and evaluating the likely outcomes of alternative regulatory choices. A major rulemaking
should be supported by both types of analysis wherever possible. Specifically, you should
prepare a CEA for all major rulemakings for which the primary benefits are improved public
health and safety to the extent that a valid effectiveness measure can be developed to represent
expected health and safety outcomes. You should also perform a BCA for major health and
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costs by an effect measure—such as tons of pollution averted, number
of lives extended, or quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained—to
10
estimate the cost per unit of benefit. Agencies also often use breakeven analysis to determine how large nonquantified benefits would
11
need to be to equal the costs of the rule. Both types of analyses are
designed in part to address the difficulties inherent in estimating
diverse regulatory impacts and in determining their dollar value, and
in part to provide differing types of information.
In this Commentary, I begin with some background information
on the conduct of regulatory CBA and its role in decisionmaking to
provide context for what follows. I then discuss how CBA deals with
selected issues that have implications for the further development of
WBA. I conclude that WBA could be a useful supplement to CBA,
but that more work is needed to determine how it can be best
implemented.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATORY REALM
In the United States, the starting point for regulatory CBA is
often an authorizing statute that requires an agency to take action to
address a particular problem or set of problems. The statute typically
defines the goals of such action and establishes some constraints on
12
what action may be undertaken. After the agency identifies the
options to be assessed, it estimates baseline conditions in the absence
of intervention and likely responses to each option. Both are
predictive exercises: most regulations are not implemented
immediately, and many years may elapse before the regulations’
effects are fully felt. As a result, baseline conditions and the effects of
each option may change over the time period considered. Economic
theory, combined with scientific evidence, provides the foundation for
safety rulemakings to the extent that valid monetary values can be assigned to the primary
expected health and safety outcomes.”).
10. For more information on the use of this approach in regulatory analysis, see generally
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., VALUING HEALTH FOR REGULATORY COSTEFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (Wilhelmine Miller, Lisa A. Robinson & Robert S. Lawrence eds.,
2006).
11. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 2 (“If the non-quantified benefits and
costs are likely to be important, you should carry out a ‘threshold’ analysis to evaluate their
significance. Threshold or ‘break-even’ analysis answers the question, ‘How small could the
value of the non-quantified benefits be (or how large would the value of the non-quantified
costs need to be) before the rule would yield zero net benefits?’”).
12. The authorizing statute may also circumscribe the extent to which CBA may be used in
setting regulatory requirements.
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these predictions and valuations, allowing analysts to build on many
decades of research in explaining and forecasting behavior.
Although the effects of the regulatory options are typically
divided into costs and benefits, there is no principled distinction:
decreased benefits can be categorized as costs, and decreased costs
can be categorized as benefits. Often (but not always), regulatory
analysts use the term “costs” to refer to the reallocation of real
resources associated with regulatory compliance, including direct
compliance expenditures, any offsetting savings, and resulting impacts
on market supply and demand. Consistent with economic theory, the
value of a real resource is determined by its opportunity cost—its
value in its best or most beneficial use. Thus the cost of a regulation is
estimated based on the net opportunity cost of forgone goods and
services that result when regulatory compliance reallocates resources
13
away from what would otherwise be produced and consumed.
14
These costs usually can be estimated using market data. For
example, for an air-pollution regulation that addresses industrial
emissions, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would
collect data on the types of technology and process changes that the
industry could implement to meet the requirements, and would then
predict which options would be implemented by firms with various
characteristics and estimate the total costs that result. The EPA
would also consider the effects of compliance costs on supply and
demand conditions in the regulated industry, as well as the effects on
15
markets for related goods and services.
The term “benefits” is generally (but again, not universally) used
to refer to the purpose for which such resource reallocation is
required—that is, the statutory or other goals that the regulation is
intended to achieve. For regulations subject to the executive-order
analytic requirements, these goals often include decreasing risks to
13. In this context, market rates are used to discount future impacts to reflect the
opportunity costs of diverting resources from other uses over time. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, supra note 3, at 31–35; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 240-R-10-001, GUIDELINES
FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6-1 to 6-20 (2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/
ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf.
14. For more information on how both costs and benefits are estimated in regulatory
analysis, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 14–42; and U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, supra note 13, at 5-1 to 8-26.
15. The analyses of costs and benefits generally include both qualitative discussion and
quantitative assessment of uncertainty. For related requirements, see OFFICE OF INFO. &
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 4, at 38–42, and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note
13, at 5-1 to 8-26.
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human health (or safety) and longevity as well as to the
16
environment.
For outcomes such as decreased health and environmental risks,
valuation is more difficult because these risk reductions are not
normally bought and sold in the marketplace. Thus, nonmarket
methods must be used to estimate individual willingness to pay
17
(WTP) or individual willingness to accept compensation (WTA).
For a beneficial outcome, such as decreased health risks, WTP
represents the maximum amount of money an individual would
voluntarily exchange to obtain the improvement, given his or her
budget constraints, whereas WTA is the smallest amount an
individual would accept to forego the improvement. In either case,
consistent with the concept of opportunity cost, money is used to
indicate the amount of other goods and services an individual would
willingly trade to obtain or forgo the improvement. Regulatory
analysts often rely on WTP rather than WTA estimates, both because
WTP studies often dominate the relevant valuation literature and
because regulatory analyses typically address improvements from the
18
status quo rather than compensation for forgoing an improvement.

16. Air-pollution regulations issued by the EPA dominate the set of regulations that are
subject to the executive-order analytic requirements, both in terms of the number of regulations
and the magnitude of their impacts. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRAFT 2012 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 13–14 tbl.1-2 (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/draft_2012_cost_benefit_report.pdf.
17. The concepts of compensating and equivalent variation (or compensating and
equivalent surplus for public goods) underlie the use of WTP and WTA. See A. MYRICK
FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES 43–94 (2D
ED. 2003) (reviewing the basic theory of defining and measuring welfare changes).
Compensating variation refers to the payment that would make the individual indifferent
between choosing the original situation and a change; equivalent variation refers to the change
in income that would lead to the same change in utility as the change in price. The two measures
differ in their starting points: for a beneficial outcome, compensating variation references the
level of utility without the improvement, whereas equivalent variation references the level with
the improvement. Id. Although there is some dispute over the meaning of utility in this context,
conventionally it is generally understood as a sense of satisfaction associated with the
consumption of goods and services—where goods include tangible items and services include
intangibles.
18. For more discussion of the theoretical and empirical differences between WTP and
WTA, see Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory
Analysis, 31 RISK ANALYSIS 1408, 1412–14 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson & Hammitt,
Behavioral Economics and Regulatory Analysis]; and Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt,
Behavioral Economics and the Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis: Towards Principles and
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Nonmarket valuation methods include stated- and revealedpreference studies. Stated-preference studies typically employ survey
techniques to ask respondents about their WTP for the outcome of
concern. They include contingent valuation surveys, which elicit WTP
for the scenario(s) described in the survey. They also include choice
experiments (or conjoint analyses), which present respondents with
several scenarios involving outcomes with differing attributes and
prices. Estimates of WTP are derived from the way in which
respondents rank, rate, or construct equivalent sets of alternatives.
Stated-preference methods are attractive because researchers can
tailor them to directly value the outcome(s) of concern; that is, the
survey can describe the specific health or environmental risks
associated with the hazards addressed by a regulation as well as the
characteristics of those affected. A key concern, however, is that
respondents may have little incentive to respond accurately because
the payment is hypothetical. Conducting a study that is likely to yield
reasonably accurate and reliable results requires careful design and
implementation, following best-practice recommendations developed
19
through many years of methodological experimentation.
Revealed-preference methods consider observed behaviors or
20
prices and preferences for related market goods. For example, wagerisk (or hedonic-wage) studies examine the change in compensation
associated with jobs that involve differing risks of fatal or nonfatal
injury, using statistical methods to separate the effects of these risks
21
from the effects of other job and personal characteristics. Although
this indirect use of market data has the advantage of relying on actual
transactions, it is often difficult to find a market good that can be used
to value particular regulatory outcomes. In addition, care must be
taken to effectively control for the other variables that affect wages or

Standards, 2 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS, Apr. 2011, at 1, 9–18 [hereinafter Robinson &
Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and the Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis].
19. Sources of recent best-practice guidance are numerous. See, e.g., IAN J. BATEMAN ET
AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002);
HANDBOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 2006).
20. The term “revealed preferences” is used to describe market behavior as well as these
nonmarket valuation methods.
21. Such studies typically compare wages and risks across a cross section of individuals at a
particular point in time, although more longitudinal studies are now emerging. For an example
of a cross-sectional study, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by
Occupation and Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29 (2004). For an example of a longitudinal study,
see Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi, Christopher Woock & James P. Ziliak, The Value of a
Statistical Life: Evidence from Panel Data, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 74 (2012).
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market prices. Because both methods have advantages and
limitations, the choice often depends on the characteristics of the
outcome being valued (for example, whether it can be modeled as an
attribute of a market good in a revealed-preference study), as well as
22
on the availability of well-conducted studies.
Ideally, the values used in regulatory analysis would reflect the
characteristics of those affected as well as the characteristics of the
regulatory outcomes, given that preferences for exchanging money
for various market and nonmarket goods and services are likely to
vary depending on these characteristics. In reality, these analyses
generally rely on population-average values. In other words, the same
values are used regardless of whether a regulation disproportionally
affects the wealthy or the poor, or the young or the old. This practice
results in part from gaps in the research literature, but it also reflects
23
concerns about the distribution of the impacts. For example, EPA’s
use of lower values for older individuals when conducting sensitivity
analysis of the value of mortality risk reductions led to a significant
outcry, suggesting that many view the use of averages as more fair or
equitable than the use of values that vary depending on population
characteristics. Whether the use of average values is in fact fair
depends on how fairness is defined: averages may not reflect the
preferences of those affected by the allocation of available resources.
Otherwise, regulatory analyses generally consider distributional
effects (who gains and who loses) separately from economic efficiency
(the net national benefits of the regulation). The standard rationale
for this distinction is that the tax and income-support system can
achieve redistributional goals more efficiently than a regulation that
is primarily designed for other purposes. For example, if an
environmental regulation makes the wealthy wealthier and the poor
poorer, the tax and income-support system can be designed to take
away the gains and redistribute the funds to the losers. Money
22. Typically, regulatory analysts rely on existing valuation studies given the substantial
time and expense associated with conducting new primary research. This benefit-transfer
approach requires careful review of the literature to identify high-quality studies that address an
outcome sufficiently similar to the outcome of the regulation. Most regulatory analyses value
various outcomes (for example, morbidity risks, mortality risks, or ecological risks) separately.
They then aggregate the results (taking care to avoid double counting) using a damage-function
approach because relatively few primary-research studies yield values that account for all of the
effects of an individual regulation (for example, all of the impacts associated with less polluted
air). See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 7-51 to 7-57.
23. Lisa A. Robinson, How U.S. Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions, 1
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y, 283, 295 (2007).
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transfers can be targeted on the outcome (income) and the
population of concern (the poor), while other types of policies
typically provide more heterogeneous benefits (such as reductions in
air pollution-related health and ecological risks) to more
heterogeneous populations (both rich and poor individuals living in
areas with high air pollution).
Regardless of whether one accepts this rationale, policymakers
are interested in information on regulations’ distributional effects.
Agencies are required to report such information under the
guidelines for regulatory analysis—as well as under other statutes and
executive orders—and may be required to alter the regulation if
certain groups (for example, children, low-income populations, or
24
minority groups) are likely to be disproportionately harmed.
The approaches used in regulatory analysis have evolved
significantly over time, as experience with these methods has
increased researchers’ understanding of how to best estimate the
value of regulatory impacts. For example, Maureen Cropper, James
K. Hammitt, and I discuss the many ways in which the methods used
to estimate the value of mortality risk reductions (the Value per
25
Statistical Life or VSL) have improved in recent years. These
improvements have led to more stringent criteria for evaluating the
quality of individual studies and for determining which estimates are
most suitable for use in regulatory analysis. EPA historically relied on
a set of twenty-six VSL studies, identified in a 1992 review, that
included twenty-one revealed-preference studies of job-related risks
26
and five stated-preference studies. The resulting VSL estimates
ranged from less than $1 million to almost $20 million, with a central
estimate of $7.4 million (2006 dollars). More recently, the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) applied new best-practice
criteria that resulted largely from an EPA Science Advisory Board
27
review of a paper developed by EPA staff. The DOT identified nine
24. For requirements related to impacts on children and low-income and minority groups,
see Exec. Order No. 13,045, 3 C.F.R. 198 (1998), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2006); and Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
25. See generally Maureen Cropper, James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing
Mortality Risk Reductions: Progress and Challenges, 3 ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 313 (2011).
26. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at B-1 to B-2.
27. The EPA has not yet determined how to best implement the resulting
recommendations in its own analyses. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING MORTALITY
RISK REDUCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A WHITE PAPER 46–47 (2010), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0563-1.pdf/$file/ee-0563-1.pdf (“These studies
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labor-market studies suitable for use in its regulatory analyses that
result in estimates ranging from about $7 million to about $13 million,
28
with a mean of $9.1 million (2012 dollars). None of these studies had
been completed at the time of the original EPA review; the DOT
rejected all of the older studies due to the availability of improved
data sources as well as evolving understanding of best practices.
Another example of CBA’s evolution is the estimation of
employment impacts. The conventional wisdom is that regulation will
increase production costs in the affected industries, and that these
costs will be passed on to consumers as increased prices, which will
lead to decreases in the quantities demanded, thereby reducing
employment. Recent research suggests that this set of assumptions is
flawed because it fails to consider the underlying characteristics of the
affected firms and markets as well as the many ways in which they
may respond to a regulation. Richard D. Morgenstern, William A.
Pizer and Jhih-Shyang Shih note that industry and market conditions
may limit the extent to which costs are passed on to consumers as well
29
as the extent to which price changes affect demand. In addition, as
production costs rise, more labor and other inputs may be required to
produce the same output. Compliance activities also may be more or
less labor intensive than pre-regulatory production. Thus, regulation
may lead employment to increase, decrease, or remain the same.
CBA is rarely, if ever, the sole basis for regulatory
decisionmaking. Agency decisions must, first and foremost, comply
with the authorizing statute and related rulings by the courts. In
could be combined or synthesized in a number of ways . . . . Our goal is to provide enough
information on the analytical options and key issues to receive clear recommendations from the
SAB-EEAC on an approach to implement for updating our guidance and on future research
directions.”); see also Catherine L. Kling & Deborah L. Swackhamer, Review of Valuing
Morality Risk Reductions for Environmental Policy: A White Paper (Dec. 10, 2010), at 1,
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/298E1F50F844BC23852578DC0059A6
16/$File/EPA-SAB-11-011-unsigned.pdf
(responding
to
the
EPA’s
request
for
recommendations).
28. Memorandum from Polly Trottenberg, Under Sec’y for Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., &
Robert S. Rivkin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs,
Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in U.S. Department of
Transportation Analyses 5–6 (Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/
docs/VSL%20Guidance.doc.
29. Richard D. Morgenstern, William A. Pizer & Jhih-Shyang Shih, Jobs Versus the
Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective, 43 J. ENVTL.. ECON. & MGMT. 412 (2002). For a
discussion of evolving best practices, see Lisa A. Robinson, Toward Best Practices: Assessing the
Effects of Regulation on Employment, in JOBS AND REGULATION (Cary Coglianese, Adam
Finkel & Chris Carrigan eds.) (forthcoming 2013), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
mrcbg/rpp/Working%20papers/RPP_2013_02_Robinson.pdf.
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addition, most regulations have potentially significant impacts that
cannot be quantified but are important to decisionmakers and other
stakeholders. Physical outcomes (for example, lives extended,
illnesses averted, or stream-miles protected) must be estimated before
they can be valued, but it can be extraordinarily difficult to answer
questions like: How does this regulation affect the ecological health
of the region? Or: To what extent does this regulation affect the
30
probability and consequences of terrorist attacks? As mentioned
earlier, agencies often supplement or replace CBA with costeffectiveness analysis or break-even analysis due largely to difficulties
in quantifying or valuing benefits, consistent with related
31
government-wide guidance. CBA can best be understood as one of
many tools that provide useful information for decisionmaking.
WBA faces many of the same challenges as CBA. Some are
independent of the type of analysis that is conducted: statutory
constraints can only be changed by congressional action, and
quantification of additional impacts requires scientific research.
However, as illustrated by the examples of evolving practices noted
above, understanding what is being measured, and how to best
measure it, is a challenge that CBA practitioners have worked to
address for many years, and one that WBA practitioners now face.
II. SOME ISSUES AND OBSERVATIONS
Why is CBA useful? Fully answering this question requires far
more space than is available here, but I provide some observations
that seem relevant to the comparison of CBA and WBA as well as to
the further development of WBA. I address the selection of values,
the inclusion of mental and emotional states in valuation, the respect
for individual preferences, and the mechanism for achieving
redistributional goals.

30. The EPA routinely includes lists of several potentially significant effects of air pollution
on human and ecological health that it is unable to quantify in its regulatory analyses. See, e.g.,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
PARTICLE POLLUTION: CHAPTER 5: BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 5-1, 5-5 tbl.5-2 (2006),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/Chapter%205--Benefits.pdf.
31. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 2, 9–14. The U.S. Office of
Management and Budget provides annual reports to Congress that document the extent to
which full CBAs have been conducted for the regulations reviewed each year and that discuss
related issues. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 16, at 21–31.
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A. Selecting Values
Both CBA and WBA face the challenge of determining how best
to value outcomes, given limitations in the available research. In
CBA, theory is directly linked to practice, aiding analysts in
identifying preferred methods for valuation and in selecting among
available studies. Although there are many unresolved or disputed
issues, this foundation enables analysts to explain what it is that they
are trying to measure (WTP or WTA), to describe the methods that
would ideally be used for such measurement (revealed or stated
preferences), to identify research practices that are most likely to lead
to accurate and reliable results, and to discuss how the limitations in
the available data and research affect the estimates.
In contrast, WBA is in its infancy. As Professor Adler notes,
there are many conceptual issues that need to be resolved before an
overarching framework can be developed that relates measures of
32
well-being to policy goals. The lack of such a framework makes it
difficult to determine what measures of well-being and what methods
of measurement are most appropriately applied in WBA. The lack of
a framework also makes it difficult to describe the uncertainties or
biases that result when alternative measures are used as proxies. For
instance, in their illustrative example, Professors Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur use one study to estimate the well-being
effects of changes in income and morbidity, a second study to
estimate the effects of premature death, and a third study to estimate
the effects of unemployment. They do not discuss whether the three
studies use similar approaches to estimate changes in well-being.
More generally, they do not describe how the uncertainties inherent
33
in the selected studies affect the interpretation of their results.
Similar issues arise in CBA. For example, the lack of WTP
estimates for nonfatal health risks means that analysts often use cost-

32. Adler, supra note 7, at 1584.
33. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 5, at 1640–43. Although Professors
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur claim that their example demonstrates the feasibility and
usefulness of WBA, id. at 1645, this claim is difficult to assess. They make several assumptions
(for example, the extent to which costs are passed on to consumers, the number of consumers
affected, consumers’ average income, cancer latency, duration of unemployment, and so forth)
that appear to be arbitrary. See id. at 1639–45. Would the analysis come to the same conclusions
if different assumptions were applied? They also select a relatively old analysis from 1998, id. at
1633, that does not reflect more recent advances in valuation or in the approaches used to assess
the effects of regulations on employment.
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of-illness or monetized QALYs as proxies. Although it is difficult to
quantify the uncertainty introduced by the use of these proxies,
analysts can discuss their strengths and limitations based on
substantial theoretical and empirical research, and can test the
sensitivity of their results to different values.
The example in Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur’s
article also suggests that studies of subjective well-being do not
currently provide values for many of the outcomes of concern in
35
regulatory analysis. In addition to the question of whether lifesatisfaction, moment-by-moment, or other measures should be used,
an obvious problem is that the example uses estimates for
“stomach/liver/kidneys or digestive problems” to measure the effects
36
of cancers on well-being. A perhaps less-obvious problem is that the
example compares well-being with and without the condition, rather
than addressing the small change in the risk of experiencing that
37
condition that is associated with the regulation.
Regulatory analysts have developed criteria for transferring
values from one context to another to more rigorously address these
types of problems in CBA. The starting point is a description of the
regulatory outcome, followed by a search for potentially relevant
valuation studies. Analysts then review the studies for quality and
applicability. The quality assessment considers, for example, the
extent to which each study follows generally accepted best practices
and provides evidence of validity and reliability. The applicability
assessment considers factors such as the similarity of the risks, the
similarity of the populations experiencing the risks, and the ability to
adjust for differences between the outcome studied and the
regulatory outcome. Depending on the research available, the
transfer may rely on a single study or combine the results from

34. See Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Skills of the Trade: Valuing Health Risk
Reductions in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 4 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS, Mar. 2013, at 107, 116–123.
35. The example is based on a 1998 regulatory analysis that addresses only three outcomes
(that is, changes in income, unemployment, and cancer risks), see Bronsteen, Buccafusco &
Masur, supra note 5, at 1633–39, whereas many more-recent regulatory analyses consider a
wider range of health and environmental risks, using data and methods that have improved over
time, e,g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 7-1 to 9-22. The extent to which wellbeing measures are available for these wider ranges of outcomes is unclear.
36. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 5, at 1641–42.
37. See id. Typically, regulatory analysts are able to estimate risk changes across a large
population, but they are not able to identify in advance (nor necessarily able to determine after
the regulation is implemented) the individuals affected—for example, which individuals would
have become ill or died prematurely in the absence of the regulation.
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several studies, and it may involve transferring a point estimate or a
valuation function that tailors the estimate to the policy scenario. The
uncertainties in the estimates are then addressed qualitatively and/or
quantitatively—for example, by conducting sensitivity or probabilistic
analysis and discussing the implications. A similar approach is needed
for WBA to aid in the selection of suitable, high quality well-being
38
estimates and to provide information on associated uncertainties.
One possible next step in the development of WBA could
involve reviewing completed regulatory analyses to identify the types
of outcomes in need of valuation, and then reviewing the well-being
literature to determine the extent to which well-being estimates are
available for these outcomes. This work could be used both to
identify areas where more well-being research is needed and to
catalog the available estimates for further review for quality and
suitability.
B. Including Mental or Emotional States in Valuation
CBA and WBA would presumably use the same approach for
predicting baseline conditions and the effects of the regulatory
options. The only difference is that WBA would value outcomes in
well-being units rather than in dollars, reflecting the psychological
impact of the outcomes. Such psychological impacts are, however,
already included in the measures used in CBA. Economists generally
recognize that decisions to purchase market goods and services, as
well as WTP for nonmarket goods or services, reflect psychological
responses to their attributes and other aspects of their consumption.
Ideally, the research studies used for valuation in CBA would address
an outcome that is identical to the outcome addressed by the
regulation, so that it elicits the same sort of responses to its attributes.
However, as noted above, gaps in the research literature often mean
that analysts transfer values from somewhat dissimilar contexts.
For example, when determining what studies to use to value
mortality risk reductions associated with homeland-security
regulations, my colleagues and I compared the outcomes addressed in

38. For further discussion of benefit transfer, see Robinson & Hammitt, supra note 34, at
109–111; and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 7-51 to 7-57. An example of this
approach is the valuation of homeland-security related mortality risk reductions, as discussed
below.
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available empirical research with the regulatory outcomes. This
comparison included the characteristics of those affected (for
example, age or income), of the risk itself (for example, illness versus
injury, or immediate versus latent effects), and of psychological
responses to the risk (for example, the degree to which it is
voluntarily incurred, viewed as under the individual’s control, or
40
particularly fearsome). Our team ultimately recommended applying
the results from a study of job-related risks because we were unable
to identify a high-quality study that addresses risks more similar to
41
those associated with homeland-security regulations. However, we
noted that, based on the available research, homeland-securityrelated mortality risk reductions might be valued up to two times
42
higher than more commonplace risks.
Thus the approach to valuation currently followed in CBA
appears to account for the types of psychological states measured in
research on subjective well-being, although it does not ask the same
questions nor use the same scales. The measures it uses appear to be
more complete than the measures proposed for use in WBA because
the former encompass other aspects of value and more varied mental
and emotional states. This does not necessarily mean that there is no
role for WBA, however. Supplementing CBA by also reporting the
value of outcomes in well-being units has the advantage of
highlighting these impacts, which may also be of interest to
decisionmakers.
C. Respecting Individual Preferences
Whether policy interventions should be selected so as to reflect
the preferences of those affected is a contentious normative issue that
I do not attempt to resolve here. However, information on these
preferences is a useful input into the policymaking process, aiding
decisionmakers in understanding the extent to which their own
preferences are and are not shared by those affected.

39. Lisa A. Robinson, James K. Hammitt, Joseph E. Aldy, Alan Krupnick & Jennifer
Baxter, Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks, 7 J. HOMELAND SECURITY &
EMERGENCY MGMT., Feb. 2010, at 18. This article is an abbreviated and updated version of the
report that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security now uses to support the values it applies
in its regulatory analyses.
40. Id. at 10–18.
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id. at 17.
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When the government regulates, it requires society to reallocate
resources to achieve particular social welfare goals. For example, an
air-pollution regulation that addresses motor-vehicle emissions is
likely to increase the costs of automobiles while reducing associated
43
health risks. CBA reflects these trade-offs by estimating how those
affected would weigh the costs and benefits that result. If market data
can be used, CBA indicates the actual trade-offs that individuals
make; if nonmarket valuation is needed, CBA’s goal is to estimate
individuals’ willingness to make such trade-offs. More fundamentally,
CBA—and the welfare-economic theory upon which it is based—
respects individual preferences, assuming that each individual is the
best judge of his or her own welfare.
WBA does not tell us how individuals prefer to allocate
resources. Whereas statistical analysis can be used to estimate the
relationship between measures of subjective well-being and income,
such analysis does not indicate whether the affected individuals would
willingly exchange income for that level of well-being. Nor does
WBA ask individuals how they would prefer to allocate money across
different goods and services, including nonmarket outcomes such as
improved health. Rather, it assumes that individuals would prefer to
see resources allocated so as to achieve a higher level of subjective
well-being, however defined. Thus, if used as a decision criterion,
WBA is more paternalistic: the analyst decides that money should be
allocated so as to maximize well-being, even if those affected would
prefer to allocate resources differently.
Of course, individuals may make mistakes in identifying their
preferences, whether revealed directly through market behavior or
indirectly through stated- or revealed-preference studies. These
mistakes may result from cognitive errors (for example, limitations in
information-processing
capacity
or
misunderstandings
of
probabilities), which, if pointed out to the individual, he or she would
44
wish to correct. For example, an individual may begin smoking
because he or she does not understand the likelihood of addiction, the
difficulty of quitting, or the associated health risks. In other cases,
behavior that is labeled as a mistake may in fact reflect an individual’s

43. Regulatory costs may be absorbed, at least in part, by the firm rather than fully passed
on to consumers, potentially affecting profits and wages as well as, or instead of, prices.
44. See James K. Hammitt, Positive v. Normative Justifications for Benefit-Cost Analysis 9–
10 (Regulatory Policy Program, Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Harvard Kennedy
Sch., Working Paper No. 13, 2012).
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true preferences. Some may choose to smoke even if well informed,
because they are risk seeking rather than risk averse, or because they
find that the pleasures of smoking outweigh its risks. How to address
affective forecasting errors also raises difficult issues. Although the
evidence suggests that individuals adapt to adverse conditions more
than predicted, they may have strong preferences regarding avoiding
the transition. To take a perhaps extreme example, research suggests
that paraplegics and quadriplegics report higher levels of well-being
45
than expected. However, individuals still may have very strong
preferences for reducing the likelihood of transitioning into a
paraplegic or quadriplegic state.
To the extent that decisionmakers can identify whether market
choices or expressed preferences are errors, they may wish to correct
46
the errors when applying values in CBA. However, it is often
difficult to separate errors from true preferences. More generally,
research by behavioral economists suggests that such errors are
context dependent, and additional work is needed to understand how
the decisionmaking anomalies and biases identified in that literature
47
affect the choices reflected in regulatory analysis. Such concerns
require thinking carefully about the extent to which normative
concerns are integrated into the conduct of CBA, but they are not a
48
sufficient reason to abandon it. In fact, some argue that CBA acts as
49
a corrective by providing evidence to counter decisionmaking biases.
45. See, e.g., Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Long-term Adjustment to Physical Disability:
The Role of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1162, 1170 (1985).
46. See Robinson & Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory Analysis, supra note
18, at 1410–12 (describing behavioral-economics theories and techniques that can more
accurately model costs and benefits); Robinson & Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and the
Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis, supra note 18, at 13–16 (“Ideally, the values used in benefitcost analysis would reflect all of the attributes of the risk, including the ambiguity and fear
associated specifically with that risk.” (citation omitted)). For a discussion of “laundering”
preferences, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 149–53 (2006).
47. For a relatively recent review of the research evidence, see Stefano DellaVigna,
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009).
48. For further discussion of positive and normative conceptions of CBA, see James K.
Hammitt, Response, Saving Lives: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distribution, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 189, 195–98 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/03-2009/Hammitt.pdf;
and Hammitt, supra note 44. For discussion of how positive and normative considerations enter
into the conduct of individual CBAs, see Christopher Robert & Richard Zeckhauser, The
Methodology of Normative Policy Analysis, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 613 (2011).
49. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1088–
96 (2000).
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Such concerns also raise questions about whether similar phenomena
may affect the responses to questions about happiness and life
satisfaction.
D. Achieving Redistributional Goals
The theoretic framework that underlies CBA also defines its
boundaries. As conventionally conducted, it focuses on economic
efficiency. Thus, supplementary information is needed to address
other outcomes of interest to decisionmakers, such as the distribution
of the impacts.
More precisely, in CBA the normative justification for choosing
policies that maximize net benefits is the Kaldor-Hicks potentialcompensation test. This test suggests that a policy is desirable if it
makes the winners better off by an amount large enough to
compensate the losers, or alternatively, that it should be rejected if
the losers can compensate the winners to not pursue the policy.
However, the test does not demand that actual compensation occur.
Although applying this test maximizes social welfare as defined
within this framework—that is, as the efficient allocation of scarce
resources—it does not address the net effect on the distribution of
resources. Any regulation is likely to have both winners and losers.
Although who gains and who loses will vary across policies, in total
the gains and losses are not likely to balance at the individual level.
When benefits and costs are measured in money terms, then
money can be redistributed, to the extent desired, to compensate the
50
losers. For instance, as noted earlier, a well-designed tax and
income-transfer system can be used to achieve redistributional goals.
But if net well-being is used as a decision criterion, how can wellbeing be redistributed? Presumably, decisions based on the net
change in well-being will also lead to gains for some and losses for
others, but measuring these values in well-being units rather than in
dollars does not provide a mechanism for addressing any inequities
that result. Although more thought into how distributional concerns
might be addressed in WBA would be useful, this issue may be of
lesser concern if we keep in mind how analysis is generally used in
regulatory decisionmaking. As noted earlier, analysis generally
provides information for decisions but does not determine them. In

50. For simplicity, this brief discussion ignores the complexities of transfers, such as the
role of administrative costs and the distortionary effects of taxes.
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this context, WBA may provide a useful supplement to CBA,
providing additional information rather than a different criterion for
decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION: WELL-BEING ANALYSIS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Whereas CBA is viewed as a useful framework for providing
information, it is not and should not be the only framework used to
inform decisionmaking. Further development of WBA could provide
a useful complement that highlights the effects of regulatory changes
on self-reported well-being. Work is needed, however, to better
define the conceptual framework, to understand advantages and
limitations of alternative approaches to measurement, and to develop
criteria for selecting well-being estimates based on their quality and
suitability for a particular context. Like the approaches applied in
CBA, the approaches applied in WBA are likely to evolve over time,
and beginning to implement WBA may provide both incentives to
conduct related research and insights into how well-being measures
can be improved.
Qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis of related
uncertainties are also needed. In CBA the shortcomings of various
valuation approaches are relatively well understood from both a
theoretical and an empirical perspective. As a result, analysts can at
minimum describe the limitations of the approach and the
implications. Professor Adler’s discussion and Professors Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur’s illustrative example suggest that more
theoretical and empirical work is needed to better understand the
limitations and uncertainties associated with applying the WBA
approach. Presumably, the goal of both CBA and WBA is to support
evidence-based decisionmaking, which requires the ability to discuss
both the nature of the evidence and its shortcomings.

